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Abstract
Motivated by the recent concerns of the scientists participating in
the elaboration of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as-
sessment reports, we study a principal-agent relationship between a
politician and a researcher that captures some stylized facts regarding
the involvement of politics into scientific research. The politician con-
tracts with a researcher in order to get some scientific advice about
a policy relevant variable. The politician trades off the policy that
he would implement in the absence of any reelection concerns with a
desire to please voters by choosing a policy that is supported by scien-
tific advice and that turns out to be the “right” policy ex post. As a
consequence, the politician bribes the researcher to bias his scientific
advice towards the ideal policy of the politician. We study the optimal
contracts under symmetric and under asymmetric information about
the researcher’s ability and concern for reputation, as well as the se-
lection of a researcher by the politician. Thereby we identify several
conflicts between the interests of the voters and those of the politician.
JEL classification: D72, D82, D83
Keywords: incentive contracts, politics, science, reputation
1 Introduction
Scientists participating in the elaboration of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment reports have recently voiced about
the involvement of politics into the drafting of the scientific results. In a
column of The Daily Caller from May 29, 2014, Richard Tol, a climate
economist, initially a lead author for the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report
Working Group II, claims that it is ”rare that a government agency with
a purely scientific agenda takes the lead on IPCC matters” and that ”as
a result, certain researchers are promoted at the expense of more qualified
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colleagues”(The Daily Caller 2014). Similarly, Robert Stavins, a leading
author in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Working Group III, expressed
his frustration and disappointment regarding the intervention of the govern-
ments representatives in making recommendations and changes in the text
of the Summary for Policymakers (SMP) “on purely political, as opposed to
scientific bases”(Stavins 2014). Stavins points to the fact that the process
followed by the IPCC in the approval of the SPM built political credibility
by sacrificing scientific integrity.
Under such circumstances, in which the political representatives inter-
fere with the scientific integrity of a research report, a natural question
arises: “Why do, then, governments commission research at all?” One an-
swer to this question comes from The LSE GV314 Group (2014) who sug-
gests that politicians select research topics that have the potential to provide
endorsement for their policy choice and make them “look good” and, at the
same time, select researchers that are more likely to deliver the desired
results. The group surveyed 205 academics that conducted governmental-
commissioned research and finds that political pressure occurs at all stages
of the research process, from the commissioning to the drafting of the results.
The authors conclude that, nonetheless, there are persistent disincentives for
researchers to compromise their scientific integrity for the sake of govern-
mental contracts, at least for the case of the British researchers comprised
in their study. Likewise, Avery (2010), discussing the manipulation of sci-
ence by political interests in the health care and climate policy domains,
maintains that science is used to justify political choices and preferences.
Any evidence that contradicts those is suppressed or even banned by legal
means. For example, he reports on a case of information leakage1 from the
government-funded Climate Research Unit of the University of East Anglia
which reveals data suppression and results manipulation by the researchers,
as well as their efforts to prevent the publication of contradicting evidence.
Moreover, the author informs about a United States Senate-approved bill
which would allow federal agencies to withhold research funding from a re-
searcher which publishes findings that are not ”within the bounds of and
entirely consistent with the evidence”. Avery (2010) argues that the word-
ing of the bill creates incentives for self-censorship on the side of the research
institutions.
1The leakage was due to hackers who downloaded the e-mails of the unit.
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However, depending on the amount of concern for academic reputation,
one would expect that some research professionals resist the political pres-
sure, while others comply with the conditions of a government contract that
require to deliver favorable results. By the same token, some politicians may
be more interested in political ammunition while others are more concerned
with quality research.
Motivated by the above-mentioned anecdotal evidence, we build a model
of delegation of research which is able to reproduce the stylized facts from
this evidence. The model describes the principal-agent relationship between
a researcher (the agent) and a politician (the principal) who uses the re-
searcher’s remuneration to induce her to bias the scientific report towards
the politician’s ideology. In the model, the politician (he) offers a contract
to a researcher (she) to get information about the state of the world which
corresponds to the optimal policy from the point of view of the voters. At
the time of contracting the state of the world is unknown to both the politi-
cian and the researcher, as well as to the voters. The contract consists of a
one-time transfer, which is paid after the researcher delivers the results of
the research, but before the state of the world is realized. Thus, the transfer
can contingent on the report of the researcher but not on the state of the
world. After the research report is made public, the politician implements a
policy. Finally, the state of the world is revealed and the payoffs are realized.
When choosing a policy the politician faces a conflict between three
objectives: Firstly, he would like the policy to be in line with his ideal
policy that we assume to be independent of the true state of the world. For
example, the politician may be intrinsically in favor of climate change policy
actions or, on the contrary, could be of the opinion that climate change need
not be addressed. Secondly, the politician is interested in pleasing the voters
by adopting a policy which is in line with the true state of the world (e.g.
a policy that mitigates climate change whenever necessary). Thirdly, we
assume that the politician can be punished by the voters for implementing
a policy that deviates from the scientific advice. The researcher, on the
other hand, derives utility from the research grant paid by the politician,
and is interested in preserving her academic reputation. Researchers may
differ with respect to their concern for reputation as well as with respect
to their ability. We consider both symmetric and asymmetric information
concerning the researcher’s type at the time of contracting.
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We make the assumption that the true signal received by the researcher,
i.e. the result of the research, is only observed by the researcher and the
politician, but not by the voters. In effect, this assumption amounts to the
politician being able to costlessly verify the researcher or that the cost of
lying for the researcher is prohibitively large.
The main results are the following. Under the first best contract the
politician can induce the researcher to release a biased report which is a
weighted average of the politician’s ideal policy and the voters’ most pre-
ferred policy which we call the ”optimal” policy. As it turns out, if the
researchers do not differ with respect to their ability, then under symmetric
information the politician contracts with the researcher who cares the least
about her reputation. Conversely, if the researchers have the same concern
for reputation, but differ in their ability, then the politician hires the re-
searcher with the highest ability. While the interests of the politicians and
the voters are aligned regarding the researcher’s ability, the voters prefer
the researcher with the highest concern for reputation. Finally, we show
that if the concern for reputation is a concave and increasing function of
researcher’s ability, then the politician will contract with either the lowest
or the highest ability researcher. Moreover, the more biased the politician’s
ideal policy is from an ex ante point of view, the more likely it is that the
politician contracts with the lowest ability researcher.
Under asymmetric information with respect to the researcher’s concern
for reputation, the politician can still implement the first best contract for
the researcher with a low reputational concern. However, the report of the
researcher with a high reputational concern is distorted relative to the first
best one which results in a policy that is closer to the voters’ most preferred
policy. Hence, voters prefer the politician to be uniformed about the re-
searcher’s concern for reputation. By contrast, asymmetry with respect to
the researcher’s ability does not create any distortion and the politician can
find transfers to implement the first best contracts.
Our paper relates to the literature on the economics of expert advice with
reputational concern (Morris 2001, Ottaviani & Sorensen 2006, Inderst &
Ottaviani 2012) and strategic transmission of information (Szalay 2009). For
example, Morris (2001) builds a repeated cheap-talk model of information
transmission from an adviser to a decision-maker, who believes that the
two parties have identical preferences only with some probability, i.e. the
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decision-maker has imperfect knowledge about the adviser’s preference for
one policy or another. Because the adviser has concerns about his reputation
with the decision-maker and does not want to appear biased, this creates an
incentive for her to lie, resulting in the decrease of social welfare. This is in
contrast with our model in which the reputational concern disciplines the
researcher to provide less biased result which has a positive effect on social
welfare. The reason for this is that we model reputation with an outside
player, for instance the academic community, rather than with the decision-
maker. We also differ from Morris (2001) in that the decision-maker can
observe the signal received by the adviser. Hence, while our focus is on
the mechanism through which the decision-maker incentivizes the adviser
to support his preferred policy through her message, in Morris (2001) the
decision-maker is a benevolent one who is interested in obtaining reliable
information from the adviser.
Similarly to Ottaviani & Sorensen (2006) our expert (the researcher) is
concerned with his reputation. However, in our model the reputation is
computed based on the distance between the published research report and
the realized state of the world instead of being based on the inference made
by the evaluator about the actual signal received by the expert. In fact, a
fundamental difference relative to Ottaviani & Sorensen (2006) is that in our
model the information transmission is compensated via a transfer from the
politician which is contingent on the report, i.e. the communication is not
cheap. Therefore, while the expert in Ottaviani & Sorensen (2006) biases
her report towards the prior belief about the state of the world in order to
maximize her expected payoff, in our model the expert reports above the
signal if the politician’s preferred policy is above the signal and vice versa.
The context studied in Inderst & Ottaviani (2012) also bears some anal-
ogy with our model. In their model, the adviser (the researcher in our
model) is an intermediary between a supplier and a customer. As in our
model, the supplier offers a commission (kickbacks) to the intermediary for
giving a biased advice to the customer. The advice issued by the expert to
the customer resembles the public message of the researcher in our model.
The policy variable in their model is the product price set by the supplier,
which takes into account the advise of the expert. Moreover, the incentives
of the expert are similar to those of the researcher in our model: On the
one hand, she is interested in the transfer received from the supplier and, on
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the other hand, she cares for her reputation with the customers. However,
Inderst & Ottaviani (2012) introduce competition between suppliers which
increases efficiency irrespective of the adviser’s concern for reputation. In
effect, the focus of this paper is on the welfare effects of the competition be-
tween the suppliers and the disclosure of the commissions to the customers.
We depart from this by considering asymmetric information with respect to
the adviser’s concern for reputation and, thus, taking a mechanism design
approach.
Szalay (2009) studies information acquisition and reporting in a principal-
agent framework. The difference to our model is that when the principal
commits to the menu of contracts, no party is informed about the agent’s
type. However, at the time of signing the contract the agent receives a noisy
and private signal about her type. The quality of this signal depends on the
agent’s choice of costly effort, neither of which is observed by the principal.
By contrast, in our model the quality of the signal received by the agent
depends on her exogenously given ability. The focus in Szalay (2009) in on
the incentive for information acquisition, which, as it turns out, always has
a positive value to the agent, as the principal makes the payment contingent
on the reported signal by the agent and on the effort level.
From a different angle, our paper also relates to Prendergast (1993) and
Ewerhart & Schmitz (2000) who study the phenomenon of “yes men” behav-
ior. The most important common element with our model is the incentive
of the agent to conform with the principal. In our model the incentive for
conformity is due to a monetary transfer from the principal to the agent,
i.e. the principal pays the agent to conform. By contrast, in Prendergast
(1993) and Ewerhart & Schmitz (2000) this incentive arises due to the sub-
jective evaluation by the principal, in the absence of an objective one (e.g.
by observing the true state of the world). In fact, in the “yes men” pa-
pers the principal prefers that the agent does not conform, i.e. that she
has integrity. However, unlike in our model in which the agent has perfect
knowledge about the parameter with which she wants to conform, in Pren-
dergast (1993) and Ewerhart & Schmitz (2000) this is unknown to the agent.
Moreover, the information acquisition in the “yes men” papers is costly to
the agent. While Prendergast (1993) shows that no contract can be designed
such that the agent both employs effort to acquire information and reveals
his true signal about the state of the world, Ewerhart & Schmitz (2000)
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show that such contracts actually exist. Such integrity contracts consist of
two parts: in the first part the agent reports her private signal and in the
second part she reports her best estimate about the signal received by the
principal (the conformity part). The agent’s payment is then based only on
the second part of the report.
The outline of our paper is the following. In Section 2 we present our
model. In Section 3 we derive the contracts under symmetric information,
i.e. when the politician knows the researcher’s ability and concern for repu-
tation. The case of asymmetric information concerning the researcher’s type
is treated in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 Model
We consider an adverse selection model in which a politician (the principal)
contracts with a researcher (the agent) in order to acquire information about
the state of the world before implementing a policy. After the contract is
signed, the researcher conducts research which produces a signal about the
state of the world. In the next stage, the researcher releases a report on the
results of his research (the message) which is observed both by the public
(the voters) and the politician. However, we assume that the true result
of the research (the signal) is observed only by the researcher and by the
politician. This models a situation where the politician acquires an exclusive
right to access and use the scientific data collected by the researcher on
behalf of the politician so that he can verify the researcher’s signal. For
simplicity we assume that the verification cost is zero.
After observing the researcher’s message and before the revelation of the
true state of the world, the politician chooses a policy. Finally, after the
state of the world is revealed, the payoffs are realized.
To fix ideas, let us introduce some notation. The politician is interested
in a prediction about the state of the world θ ∈ {θL, θH}, where L and
H stand for low and high, respectively and θL < θH . Both the politician
and the researcher have the same prior P (θL) that the state is low. Let
P (θL) = p, where 0 < p < 1. For further reference let θ¯ = (1− p)θH + pθL
denote the prior expectation about the state of the world.
The result of the research is a signal s ∈ {sL, sH}. The precision of the
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signal depends on the ability of the researcher, e ∈ [0, 1] in the following
way: For i = L,H,
P (si|θi) = q(e), (1)
where qe > 0, q(0) =
1
2 and q(1) ≤ 1. Hence, if the researcher’s ability is
zero, the signal is uninformative and the higher the ability of the researcher,
the higher the precision of the signal.
Both the politician and the researcher have an expected utility function.
The politician’s utility UP depends on his ideal policy (ideology) γ ∈ R, the
chosen policy y ∈ R, the researcher’s message m ∈ R, the transfer T ∈ R he
pays to the researcher and the true state of the world. More precisely, we
assume that
UP (y,m, T |θ) = −αγ(γ − y)
2 − αm(m− y)
2 − αθ(θ − y)
2 − T, (2)
where αγ ≥ 0, αm ≥ 0, and αθ ≥ 0 are the weights the politician assigns
to the policy being close to his ideology, the policy being consistent with
the public message and the policy being close to the true state of the world,
respectively. Hence, the objective of the politician is to implement a pol-
icy which is close to his ideal policy γ, but at the same time pleases the
voters who would like the policy to be equal to the true state of the world.
The latter criterion would increase the politician’s re-election probability,
although we do not explicitly model an electoral stage in this paper. More-
over, the politician would like the researcher’s public message to support
his policy choice because he is punished by the voters if the chosen policy
does not conform with the research findings, i.e. the public message of the
researcher.2
The researcher, on the other hand, is interested in sending a public
report (the message) which does not undermine her reputation while she is
not interested in the chosen policy. The utility UR of the researcher is given
by
UR(m,T |θ) = T − β(θ −m)2, (3)
2Observe that voters in fact have an incentive to punish the politician if the policy is
not in line with the scientific advice even if voters are ultimately only interested in the
distance of the policy to the true state of the world and even if voters know that the
scientific advice may be biased. Punishing the politician for deviating from the scientific
advice allows the voters to discipline the politician so that he chooses a policy that is
closer to the voters’ optimal policy than without this form of punishment.
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where β ≥ 0 is the weight she assigns to her reputation. The researcher’s
reputation is measured as the distance between the true state of the world
and the forecast she provides in the public report.
The order of moves is the following. First, the politician offers a contract





, where mi is the message
demanded from the researcher and T i is the transfer paid to the researcher
if the signal is si, i = L,H. The researcher then decides whether to accept
or reject the contract in which case she receives some reservation utility U0.
If the researcher accepts the contract she produces a signal about the state
of the world. Upon receiving the signal, the researcher sends her message
and the politician rationally updates her beliefs about the state of the world.
Finally, the politician chooses the policy yi, i = L,H.
3 The first best
As a benchmark we first study the case where the politician knows the
researcher’s type, i.e. her ability e and her concern for reputation β. Let
pH be the probability that the researcher receives signal sH , i.e.
pH = P (sH |e) = P (sH |θH)P (θH) + P (sH |θL)P (θL) = p+ (1− 2p)q(e) (4)
By σH (σL) we denote the updated probability of the high state of the world
after receiving a high (low) signal, i.e.
σH = P (θH |sH) =
P (sH |θH)P (θH)






σL = P (θH |sL) =
P (sL|θH)P (θH)
P (sL|θH)P (θH) + P (sL|θL)P (θL)
=
(1− p)(1− q(e))
1− p− (1− 2p)q(e)
(6)
Finally, let us denote by θ¯i = σiθH +(1−σi)θL the posterior expected state
of the world given signal si, i = H,L.
In the first best contract the politician observes the researcher’s charac-
teristics, i.e. her ability e and her reputation type β. Thus, the politician
can condition the transfer on the public message sent by the researcher. Let
mi, yi, and T i be the message, the policy and the transfer if the signal is
9




under the researcher’s participation constraint
E[UR] ≥ U0. (8)
It is straightforward to see that the researcher’s participation constraint
(8) is binding in the optimal contract which is derived in Appendix A.1. In
the optimal contract the messages and policies are
mi =
[β(αγ + αθ + αm) + αmαθ]θ¯
i + αmαγγ
β(αγ + αθ + αm) + αmαθ + αmαγ






αθ + αm + αγ
, i = L,H, (10)
and the transfers TH and TL are such that the researcher’s participation
constraint is binding. Observe that only expected transfers are determined
in the optimal contract.
Hence, the politician induces the researcher to send a biased public report
which is a weighted average of the ex-post expectation about the state of the
world, θ¯i and the politician’s ideal policy, γ. In fact, the researcher sends
a message larger than θ¯i if the politician’s ideal policy is larger than the
posterior about the state of the world and sends a message lower than θ¯i in
the opposite case. Similarly, the policy choice is a weighted average of the
ex-post expected state of the world, the public report and the politician’s
ideal policy, with the weights exactly matching the corresponding weights
in the politician’s utility function. Substituting (9) into (10) yields
yi = λθ¯i + (1− λ)γ, i = L,H, (11)
where
λ =
β(αθ + αm) + αmαθ
β(αγ + αθ + αm) + αm(αθ + αγ)
. (12)
Let us now do some comparative statics with respect to the parameters
of our model. From (9), (11) and (12) it is easy to verify that the distance
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of both the message and the policy, to the optimal policy θ¯i is decreasing in
the researcher’s concern for reputation. We state this result in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 The higher the researcher’s concern for reputation β, the
closer is the optimal policy to the expected state of the world.
The intuition for this result is simple: The more the researcher cares for
her reputation (the higher β), the higher the weight on the expected state
in her report and, consequently in the policy induced by this report. If the
researcher completely disregards her reputation (β = 0), then the report
coincides with the policy and they are both equal to the weighted average
of the ex-post expected state of the world and the politician’s preferred
policy, with the corresponding weights from the politician’s utility function.
Conversely, if the researcher is very concerned with her reputation (β →∞),
then she publishes an unbiased report, i.e. mi = θ¯i, while the politician still
chooses a policy which is a weighted average of the ex-post state of the world
and his ideal policy.
Proposition 1 implies that voters, who are interested in the adoption
of the optimal policy, would prefer a researcher with a high concern for
reputation. However, the interests of the voters are conflicting with those
of the politician, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under the first best contract, the politician’s utility decreases
in the researcher’s concern for reputation.
Hence, unlike the voter, the politician prefers to contract with the re-
searcher with the lowest concern for reputation. Concerning ability, however,
the voters and politician’s interests are aligned: Both prefer to hire the re-
searcher with the highest ability. For the voters this follows from the fact
that the precision of the signal increases in the researcher’s ability so that
the expected state and hence the chosen policy (cf. (11) move closer to the
true state of the world. For the politician we state the result in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Under the first best contract, the politician’s utility increases
in the ability of the researcher.
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The researcher reports truthfully if the politician is not punished for
deviating from the public report (αm = 0) or if the politician disregards
her ideal policy (αγ = 0), or if he assigns an infinitely large weight to the
policy correctly addressing the state of the world (αθ → ∞). However,
only in the last two cases would the politician be forced to also implement
the optimal policy yi = θ¯i, while in the first case he implements a policy
which is a weighted average of the ex-post expected state and his ideal
policy. Conversely, when the politician gives an infinitely large weight to the
policy being close to the message (αm →∞), then he chooses a policy that
perfectly matches the researcher’s report, which is again a weighted average
of the ex-post expected state of the world and the politician’s preferred
policy. Similarly, if the politician’s concern for his ideal policy is infinitely
large compared to his concern for punishment by the voters (αγ → ∞),
then he implements exactly this policy. In this case the researcher publishes
a biased report which is a weighted average of the ex-post expected state
and the politician’s preferred policy, with the weights given by β and αm,
respectively. Finally, if the politician is not concerned with addressing the
optimal policy (αθ = 0), then both the message and the policy are biased.
4 Asymmetric information
4.1 The researcher’s concern for reputation
In this section we consider the case in which the researcher has private
information about her concern for reputation β, but her ability is known
to the politician. We also maintain the assumption that the politician can
observe the signal received by the researcher. For simplicity we restrict to
the case where there are only two types of researchers: a researcher with a
high concern for reputation, characterized by βh, and a researcher with a
low concern for reputation, characterized by βℓ, where βℓ < βh. While the
politician does not know which type of researcher he faces, he knows the
probability that a researcher has a high concern for reputation. We denote
this probability by pβ, i.e.
P (βh) = pβ , 0 < pβ < 1. (13)
Under asymmetric information concerning the researcher’s reputational
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concern, the politician offers a menu of contracts such that the high-reputation
researcher and the low-reputation researcher select themselves into the ap-
propriate contract. Let the menu of contracts be (Ch, Cℓ), where Cj =
(T ij ,mij)i=H,L, is the contract for type j, j = h, ℓ, and i = H,L refers to
the signal, sH or sL, received by the researcher. The politician chooses the
policies (yij)i=H,L,j=h,ℓ and the contracts C
h, Cℓ to maximize his expected
utility subject to the participation and incentive compatibility constraints of
the two types of researchers. By E[UR(C)|β] we denote the expected utility
of a researcher under contract C given that his reputational concern is β.
The politician then solves the following optimization problem:
max




R(Ch)|βh] ≥ U0 (15)
(PCℓ) : E[U
R(Cℓ)|βℓ] ≥ U0 (16)
(ICh) : E[U
R(Ch)|βh] ≥ E[UR(Cℓ)|βh] (17)
(ICℓ) : E[U
R(Cℓ)|βℓ] ≥ E[UR(Ch)|βℓ] (18)
Following the usual argument, (PCh) and (ICℓ) bind. The proofs are
found in Appendix A.5 and A.6, respectively. Note that from the binding
incentive constraint for the low type, (ICℓ), the fact that β
h > βℓ and (PCh)
it follows that (PCℓ) always holds. In Appendix A.7 we verify that (ICh)
is satisfied if we maximize the politician’s expected utility subject to the
binding constraints (PCh) and (ICℓ).
The optimal contract menu is as follows. The messages demanded from
13
the high and low type are
mih =
θ¯i[(βh − (1− pβ)β
ℓ)(αγ + αθ + αm) + pβαmαθ] + γpβαmαγ
(βh − (1− pβ)βℓ)(αγ + αθ + αm) + pβαm(αθ + αγ)




θ¯i[βℓ(αγ + αθ + αm) + αmαθ] + γαmαγ
βℓ(αγ + αθ + αm) + αm(αθ + αγ)
, i = L,H. (20)





αθ + αm + αγ
, i = L,H, j = h, ℓ. (21)
Again only the expected transfers are determined in the optimal contract
menu.
Comparing (20) with (9) one can easily see that the low-reputation re-
searcher sends the same message as in the first best case in which the politi-
cian could observe her type, but the transfer is now such that she gets a
positive surplus. However, the message for the high-reputation researcher is
distorted as compared to the first best message, but her surplus is kept at
zero. Moreover, this distortion is such that the high-reputation researcher
reports closer to the signal. The intuition for this is simple. Because the
low-reputation researcher would pretend to be of high type, the politician
has to distort the contract for the high-reputation researcher and pay an
information rent to the low-reputation researcher in order to induce her to
reveal her true type. Hence, the high-reputation researcher is not compen-
sated enough to bias her report as in the first-best case.
From (19) and (21), on the one hand and from (9) and (10), on the
other hand, it follows that a researcher with high concern for reputation
(j = h) sends a message which induces a policy closer to the optimal policy
θ¯i when the politician cannot observe her reputational concern (asymmetric
information about β) than when the politician can identify the type of the
researcher. Hence, the following result is immediate.
Proposition 4 For any given level of ability, the voters prefer the politician
to be uninformed about the researcher’s concern for reputation.
In addition, note thatmiH > miL (miH < miL) if and only if θ¯i > γ (θ¯i <
γ). Similarly to the case of symmetric information, from equations (20) and
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(19) it is easy to see that the messages are weighted averages of the expected
state of the world θ¯i and the politician’s ideal policy γ. Moreover, it is easy
to verify that for the high β type the weight on the expected state of the
world is larger than for the low β type. Hence, if the expected state is larger
than the ideal policy, then the message of the high-reputational type must
be larger than the message of the low type and vice-versa for the expected
state being smaller than the ideal policy.
4.2 The researchers’ ability
We now assume that the politician can observe the researcher’s concern for
reputation, β, as well as the researcher’s signal, but he cannot observe her
research ability e. Again, for simplicity let there be two types or researchers
in the economy: a low-ability type with e = eℓ and a high-ability type with
e = eh, such that eℓ < eh. The politician only knows the probability that a
researcher has a high ability which we denote by pe, i.e.
P (eh) = pe, (22)
where 0 < pe < 1. We shortly write p
ij = P (si|ej) and σij = P (θH |si, ej), i =
H,L, j = h, ℓ.
As in the case of asymmetric information with respect to β, the politi-
cian designs a contract menu (Ch, Cℓ), where Cj = (T ij ,mij)i=H,L, is the
contract for type j, j = h, ℓ, and i = H,L refers to the signal, sH or sL, re-
ceived by the researcher. The politician chooses the policies (yij)i=H,L,j=h,ℓ
and the contracts Ch, Cℓ to maximize his expected utility subject to the
participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the two types of re-
searchers. By E[UR(C)|e] we denote the expected utility of a researcher
under contract C given that his ability is e. The politician then solves the
following optimization problem:
max




R(Ch)|eh] ≥ U0 (24)
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(PCeℓ ) : E[U
R(Cℓ)|eℓ] ≥ U0 (25)
(ICeh) : E[U
R(Ch)|eh] ≥ E[UR(Cℓ)|eh] (26)
(ICeℓ ) : E[U
R(Cℓ)|eℓ] ≥ E[UR(Ch)|eℓ] (27)
The first best messages and policies given by (9) and (10), respectively,
maximize (23) under the binding participation constraints (24) and (25).
These contracts are given by
mij =
θ¯ij [β(αγ + αθ + αm) + αmαθ] + γαmαγ
β(αγ + αθ + αm) + αm(αθ + αγ)






αθ + αm + αγ
, i = L,H, j = h, ℓ, (29)
where θ¯ij = σijθH+(1−σij)θL. It turns out that there are transfers such that
the first best contracts also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
(26) and (27), i.e. we can state the following result:
Theorem 1 If the politician does not observe the researcher’s ability, then
there are transfers such that the politician can implement the first best con-
tracts given by (28) and (29).
4.3 The optimal researcher
Let us now return to the first best contract, in which case the politician can
observe both the concern for reputation of the researcher and her ability. We
have seen that in this situation the politician prefers to hire a researcher with
a low concern for reputation, but with high ability for research. However, in
the real world it is unlikely that high-ability researchers are not concerned
with their reputation. Hence, in the context of our model the politician faces
a trade-off between reliable information about the state of the world, which
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is offered by a high-ability researcher and cheap manipulation of the research
report, which is offered by a researcher with a low concern for reputation.
In this section we analyze the optimal researcher from the point of view
of the politician, assuming that the researcher’s concern for reputation is
positively correlated with her ability. More precisely, in the following we
assume that β is a twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly
concave function in e, i.e. βe > 0 and βee < 0. Moreover, we assume that





, for e ∈ [0, 1].
Under these assumptions, the optimal researcher from the point of view
of the politician is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If the researcher’s concern for reputation is a twice con-
tinuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave function in e, and if
q(e) = 1+e2 for all e ∈ [0, 1], then the politician will always choose to contract
with either the lowest ability researcher (e = 0) or with the highest ability
researcher (e = 1).
The result is illustrated in Figure 1 for certain parameter values. This is
the case in which the politician chooses the highest-ability researcher and,
consequently, the one with the highest reputational concern.
Figure 1: Politician’s utility: αm = αγ = αθ = 1, γ = 20, p = 0.3, θH = 15, θL =
1, β(e) = −e2 + 2e
Hence, the trade-off between informative research results and the possi-
bility for inducing biased research report leads the politician to either hire
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the least able researcher who can also be more easily manipulated to deliver
a biased report or, on the contrary, the most able researcher who also has
the highest concern for academic reputation. It is, therefore, important to
understand under which conditions the politician will hire one or the other
of the researchers. The following proposition states this condition.
Proposition 6 Assume that β is a twice continuously differentiable, in-
creasing and strictly concave function in e and that q(e) = 1+e2 for all
e ∈ [0, 1]. Then the politician prefers the most able researcher if γ is suffi-
ciently close to the prior θ¯ of the state of the world.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: the lower the bias of the
politician the more he prefers to learn the true state of the world and, thus,
to hire the more able researcher. Conversely, as his bias is larger (γ is further
from the prior) the more he prefers the ability to manipulate the researcher
towards the desired report to quality information about the state of the
world.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an adverse selection model which captures some
stylized facts regarding the involvement of politics into the production of
policy research. We explored the outcome of contracting between a politi-
cian who hires a researcher to find information about the state of the world.
In our model the politician has preference for a certain policy which is inde-
pendent of the state. However, he is punished by the voters if the adopted
policy is not in line with the public research report. Finally, the politician
is also interested in correctly addressing the state of the world (for exam-
ple, in order to increase the probability of re-election). The researchers,
on the other hand, may differ with respect to their ability for research or
their concern for academic reputation. We, therefore, consider both the case
of symmetric and asymmetric information with respect to the researcher’s
ability and concern for reputation, respectively, but we assume that the
politician can always observe the research results.
Although in the first-best contract all researchers bias their research re-
ports to support the politician’s preferred policy, the politician prefers to
contract with the researcher who has the lowest concern for reputation.
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This is in contrast with the voters preference, as a researcher with a high
concern for reputation induces a policy closer to the optimal policy. How-
ever, the politician’s and the voter’s preferences are aligned when it comes
to researcher’s ability: A high ability researcher is preferred by both parties.
The first important result derived from our model is obtained in the
case of asymmetric information with respect to the researcher’s concern for
reputation. It turns out that voters prefer that the politician is uninformed
about the type of the researcher. This is due to the fact that, while the
low-reputation researcher reports as in the first-best contract, the message
of the high-reputation researcher is now distorted such that it is closer to
the true signal. Consequently, the induced policy is closer to the optimal
policy.
Finally, it seems plausible that a researcher’s concern for reputation is
positively correlated with her ability. This leads us to the second result of
the paper: Under symmetric information the politician prefers either the
lowest ability researcher or the highest ability researcher. In particular, if
the politician’s preferred policy is close enough to the prior about the state
of the world, then he has little need to manipulate the research results.
Therefore, the politician prefers to learn quality information about the state
of the world and, thus, hires the most able researcher. If, on the contrary,
his ideal policy is far from the prior, then the trade-off between reputation
and ability makes the lowest ability researcher more attractive since she is
more cheaply manipulated to write a biased report.
Two implications for the process of commissioning policy research can
be formulated from our results. First, in order to protect voters’ inter-
ests, whenever possible the tender for research contracts should be con-
ducted anonymously such that information about academic reputation re-
mains hidden. Second, our results suggest that it is, indeed, the case that,
everything else constant, low-integrity researchers may be preferred by the
policy-makers. Moreover, we show that fears that in certain cases less qual-
ified researchers are promoted at the expense of the more qualified ones in
government-commissioned projects, are not undue. Unsurprisingly though,
the reason for sacrificing competency is the greater manipulative power of
the politics over the former than over the latter.
While our model is general and it refers to any type of research meant to
guide the formulation of policy actions, climate change research is a promi-
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nent application. It is notorious that doctrines, ideologies and beliefs outside
the scientific evidence often guide the policy agenda on climate change. As
we showed in the introduction, the latest IPCC reports have witnessed an
alarming lead of the politics in summarizing the results of the climate change
research. This is more of a serious concern as these reports inform the inter-
national negotiations on climate change, which involve enormous amounts
of money and ultimately affect all the inhabitants of our planet.
20
A Proofs




E[UP ] = −αγ
[




pHσH(θH − yH)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL − yH)2




pH(mH − yH)2 + (1− pH)(mL − yL)2
]
− pHTH − (1− pH)TL
(A.1)
s.t.
E[UR] = pHTH + (1− pH)TL
− β
[
pHσH(θH −mH)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mH)2




It is straightforward to see that the researcher’s participation constraint (A.2)
is binding in the optimal contract. From the binding participation constraint we
obtain TL:3















σL(θH −mL)2 + (1− σL)(θL −mL)2
]
(A.3)
Substituting TL(TH ,mH ,mL) into (A.1) and maximizing over mH ,mL, yH , yL,
yields the following messages
mi =
[β(αγ + αθ + αm) + αmαθ]θ¯
i + αmαγγ
β(αγ + αθ + αm) + αmαθ + αmαγ






αθ + αm + αγ
, i = L,H (A.5)
3Note that only the expected transfer is determined while the individual transfers are
undetermined.
21
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The distance of the policy from the expected state of the world is given by:
δ(β) =
∣∣yi − θ¯i∣∣ =
∣∣γ − θ¯i∣∣ (αm + β)αγ
β(αm + αγ + αθ) + αm(αγ + αθ)
,






(β(αm + αγ + αθ) + αm(αγ + αθ))2
< 0
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2






where mL, mH , yL and yH are the first best policies and messages and




0 which proves the claim.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3







(mH ,mL, yH , yL) =






p2(θH − θL)2(1− p)2((αγ + αm + αθ)β
2 + αmα
2
θ + 2αmαθβ + α
2
θβ)(2q(e)− 1)
(2pq(e)− q(e)− p+ 1)2(2pq(e)− q(e)− p)2(αm(αγ + αθ) + (αm + αθ + αγ)β)
.




and, thus, E[UP ] is increasing in e.
A.5 (15) binds in equilibrium.
Suppose it does not, i.e. it is slack. This means that:
(PCh) : p
HTHh + (1− pH)TLh−
− βh[pHσH(θH −mHh)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHh)2]−
− βh[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLh)2] > U0
(A.6)
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Then, using (ICℓ) and the fact that β
h > βℓ we have the following:
pHTHℓ + (1− pH)TLℓ − βℓ[pHσH(θH −mHℓ)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHℓ)2]−
− βℓ[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLℓ)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLℓ)2] =
= pHTHh + (1− pH)TLh − βℓ[pHσH(θH −mHh)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHh)2]−
− βℓ[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLh)2] >
> pHTHh + (1− pH)TLh − βh[pHσH(θH −mHh)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHh)2]−
− βh[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLh)2] > U0,
(A.7)
This means that the politician can increase his expected utility by decreasing each
of THℓ, TLℓ, THh, TLh by a small ǫ > 0, without violating any of the participation
constraints. Again, this is a contradiction to the fact that these were the optimal
transfers. Therefore, (PCh) binds in equilibrium.
A.6 (18) binds in equilibrium
Suppose it does not, i.e. it is slack. This means that:
pHTHℓ + (1− pH)TLℓ − βℓ[pHσH(θH −mHℓ)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHℓ)2]−
− βℓ[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLℓ)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLℓ)2] >
> pHTHh + (1− pH)TLh − βℓ[pHσH(θH −mHh)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHh)2]−
− βℓ[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLh)2] >
> pHTHh + (1− pH)TLh − βh[pHσH(θH −mHh)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHh)2]−
− βh[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLh)2],
(A.8)
where the last inequality follows from βh > βℓ. Note that the last term in (A.8) is
greater or equal to U0 by (PCh). Therefore, it follows that:
pHTHℓ + (1− pH)TLℓ − βℓ[pHσH(θH −mHℓ)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHℓ)2]−
− βℓ[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLℓ)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLℓ)2] > U0,
(A.9)
i.e., (PCℓ) is slack. This means that the politician can increase his expected utility
by decreasing THℓ and TLℓ, without violating any constraints. This contradicts the
fact that THℓ and TLℓ were optimal payments. Therefore, it must be that (ICℓ)
binds.
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Hh)2 + pH(1− pβ)(γ − y
Hℓ)2]−
− αγ [(1− p
H)pβ(γ − y
























Lh − yLh)2 + (1− pH)(1− pβ)(m
Lℓ − yLℓ)2]−
− pHpβT
Hh − pH(1− pβ)T
Hℓ − (1− pH)pβT





HTHh + (1− pH)TLh−
− βh[pHσH(θH −mHh)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHh)2]−
− βh[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLh)2] ≥ U0
(A.11)
(PCℓ) : p
HTHℓ + (1− pH)TLℓ−
− βℓ[pHσH(θH −mHℓ)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHℓ)2]−
− βℓ[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLℓ)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLℓ)2] ≥ U0
(A.12)
(ICh) : p
HTHh + (1− pH)TLh−
− βh[pHσH(θH −mHh)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHh)2]−
− βh[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLh)2] ≥
≥ pHTHℓ + (1− pH)TLℓ−
− βh[pHσH(θH −mHℓ)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHℓ)2]−




HTHℓ + (1− pH)TLℓ−
− βℓ[pHσH(θH −mHℓ)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHℓ)2]−
− βℓ[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLℓ)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLℓ)2] ≥
≥ pHTHh + (1− pH)TLh−
− βℓ[pHσH(θH −mHh)2 + pH(1− σH)(θL −mHh)2]−
− βℓ[(1− pH)σL(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pH)(1− σL)(θL −mLh)2]
(A.14)
In Appendix A.5 and A.6 we have shown that (A.11) and (A.14) are binding.
Together with βh > βℓ this implies that (A.12) is satisfied. We ignore (A.13) for the
moment and later verify that it holds in the contract menu we derive. From (A.11)
we can solve for TLh = TLh(THh) and from (A.14) we can solve for TLℓ = TLℓ(THℓ)
















































We substitute TLℓ and TLh from (A.15) and (A.16) into (A.10) and maximize
over mij , yij , i = H,L, j = ℓ, h, which yields the following messages and policies:
mih =
θ¯i[(βh − (1− pβ)β
ℓ)(αγ + αθ + αm) + pβαmαθ] + γpβαmαγ
(βh − (1− pβ)βℓ)(αγ + αθ + αm) + pβαm(αθ + αγ)
, i = L,H,
(A.17)
miℓ =
θ¯i[βℓ(αγ + αθ + αm) + αmαθ] + γαmαγ
βℓ(αγ + αθ + αm) + αm(αθ + αγ)
, i = L,H, (A.18)







αθ + αm + αγ
, i = L,H, j = h, ℓ. (A.19)
Finally, we verify that (ICh) holds. Substituting T
Lℓ and TLh from (A.15) and
(A.16) into (ICh), the latter is equivalent to:(
pH(mHh −mHℓ)(mHh +mHℓ − 2θ¯H) + (mLh −mLℓ)(mLh +mLℓ − 2θ¯L)(1− pH)
)
(βH − βL) <
0. Next, using the expressions for mij it can be shown that





i)2(βh − βℓ)(αγ + αm + αθ)((2βLpβ + β
h − βℓ)(αγ + αm + αθ) + 2pβαm(αγ + αθ))
((βLpβ + βh − βℓ)(αγ + αm + αθ) + pβαm(αγ + αθ))2((αγ + αm + αθ)βL + αm(αγ + αθ)2)
< 0
for i = H,L. Therefore, pH(mHh−mHℓ)(mHh+mHℓ−2θ¯H)+(mLh−mLℓ)(mLh+mLℓ−
2θ¯L)(1− pH) < 0 and this completes the proof.
A.8 Proof of Theorem 1
It suffices to show that there are transfers such that for the messages and policies given
by (28) and (29) we can find transfers THh, THℓ, TLh and TLℓ such that the equations
(24), (25), (26) and (27) are satisfied with equality (i.e. both the participation and the
incentive compatibility constraints are binding). This amounts to solving the following
linear equation system:






































(1− pHh)σLh(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pHh)(1− σLh)(θL −mLh)2
)
























(1− pHℓ)σLℓ(θH −mLℓ)2 + (1− pHℓ)(1− σLℓ)(θL −mLℓ)2
)










(1− pHℓ)σLℓ(θH −mLh)2 + (1− pHℓ)(1− σLℓ)(θL −mLh)2
)
(A.23)
This linear equation system has a unique solution which can easily be checked by
computing the determinant of the corresponding matrix: −(pHh−pHℓ)2 6= 0, because eℓ <
eh. Thus, there exist transfers which support the first best contracts under asymmetric
information.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
For convenience, let us denote E[UP ] = f(e, β), where E[UP ] is given by (A.1) evaluated
at the first best contract, and F (e) = f(e, β(e)). Since f is a continuous function of both
e and β and β is continuous in e, then F is continuous in e. Further, since e ∈ [0, 1], which
is a compact interval, then F is bounded and by the extreme value theorem it has at least
one maximum.















Hence, F can be both increasing and decreasing function of e.

























The signs of the factors in the last term of (A.25) are obvious due to the concavity of β(e)



















4e2(2p− 1)2 + 1
)
(2ep− e+ 1)3 (αmαγ + αγβ + αmαθ + αmβ + αθβ) (2ep− e− 1)
3
> 0











m(αγ + αm + αθ)
(2pe− e+ 1)(2pe− e− 1)(β(αγ + αm + αθ) + αm(αγ + αθ))3
Ω (A.26)
where
Ω =(2pe− e+ 1)(2pe− e− 1)γ(γ − 2θ¯)−
− (1− p)2(4pe2 − e2 + 1)(θH)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
− 2p(1− p)(1− e2)θLθH︸ ︷︷ ︸
+




A necessary condition for F to be concave in e is that
∂2f
∂β2
is negative. For this
Ω has to be positive. If we regard Ω as a function of γ, since 2pe − e − 1 < 0,
Ω has a maximum and this is reached at γ = θ¯. However, for γ = θ¯ we have
Ω = −4e2p2(θH − θL)2(p− 1)2 < 0. Therefore, ∂
2f
∂β2
> 0. Thus, F is globally convex
in e and being defined on the compact interval [0, 1], it reaches the maximum at
either e = 0, e = 1 or both.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 6
Let b = β(0) and B = β(1). Since β is increasing in e, b < B. Then, the politician
prefers the most able researcher if ∆(γ) = F (1)−F (0) = C1(−γ
2 +2θ¯γ) +C2 > 0,
where C1 and C2 are combinations of parameters and b and B, with C1 > 0. Hence,
∆ is concave in γ and its maximum is reached at γ = θ¯. Moreover, it is positive
for γ in the interval θ¯−
√
θ¯2 + C2/C1 and θ¯+
√
θ¯2 + C2/C1. Hence, the politician
prefers e = 1 if his ideal policy γ is around the prior.
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